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How the Scots Bequeathed Us Political Economy 
There is a Genesis Myth for the Anglophone social sciences, or at 
least one found commonly amongst economists and their camp-
followers. It goes like this: before the 18th century there were 
markets, but people behaved as though they were enshrouded in a 
great fog, which prevented them from seeing ‘society’ with any 
clarity or perspicuity. Then, something happened to dispel the fog 
(it could have been the Industrial Revolution, or the Rise of 
Science, or the Protestant Reformation, or we know not what) in a 
most unlikely geographical setting, namely, Scotland in the 1700s. 
In this myth, the Scottish Enlightenment stands as the great 
watershed in social thought about the modern world; it marked 
the commencement of ‘social science’, if not the very birth of 
modernity in most of its multifarious disguises. Casting off the 
medieval shackles of feudalism, religion and superstition, figures 
such as Adam Ferguson, David Hume, and especially Adam Smith, 
under the steady guidance of Baconian empiricism, reported the 
regularities of social life as they really were. Amazingly, far from 
gathering together a jumble of meaningless data, they were able to 
distill out of their observations transtemporal and transcultural 
general principles of human social organization; principles of such 
compelling universality that they persist (although in much 
revised formats) down to the present day in the social sciences.1 
These ‘principles’ often boil down in practice to a relatively 
                                                        
1 Perhaps the cultural icon who, by their writings, does their utmost to 
prevent this paragraph from bootless caricature is Friedrich Hayek 
(1938, 1948, 1954). However, other examples would be: (Hamowy, 1968; 
Landreth & Colander, 1994; Niehans 1998) 
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superficial version of laissez-faire economics, perhaps in 
conjunction with some non-specific enthusiasm for the growth 
potential of market economies, in conjunction with an 
endorsement of grounding social explanation in the natural 
tendencies and predispositions of the individual agent. 
Intellectual historians who do not see their role as providing 
the spatiotemporal ‘origins’ of modern social science have long 
treated this genesis myth with skepticism. As one might expect, 
they are more inclined to detect continuity where others insist 
upon rupture; but more importantly, they have provided resources 
to revise many components of the genesis account. The politics of 
the Scottish Enlightenment have come in for close scrutiny by 
such contemporaries as J.G. Pocock, Nicholas Phillipson and 
Donald Winch; they have explained the extent to which the usual 
laissez-faire gloss on Smith and Hume not only misrepresents the 
actual texts, but obscures the ways in which the political context of 
the Scottish Enlightenment tended to shape what were retailed as 
‘universalistic’ prescriptions. Historians of the Scottish university 
system such as Paul Wood, Michael Brown and Charles Camic 
have suggested that the special character of the Scottish 
educational reforms may have had quite a bearing on the question 
of how a relative backwater could have become, albeit unevenly, 
an intellectual hothouse. One of the present authors, along with 
the literary historian Mary Poovey, has challenged the proposition 
that Scottish social theory, and in particular, Smith’s political 
economy, was predicated upon straightforwardly empiricist 
procedures. It seems that the notions of “science” which informed 
these 18th century narratives cannot be easily reconciled with 
modern conceptions of science, or indeed, rendered as simple 
projections of natural science onto society, as tended to be the 
practice from the 19th century onwards. Finally, Salim Rashid has 
shown that contemporaries by and large did not regard Smith & 
Co. as the last word in common sense, nor even as much in the 
way of providing epoch-making departures. In a very real sense, 
the “Scottish Enlightenment” was an edifice predominantly 
constructed well after the fact to be something cogent and 
coherent, pitched beyond the simple human tendency to make the 
best of a bad situation. It was only in the 19th century that various 
commentators such as Dugald Stewart came to stress “the 
commercial, modernizing benefits of the enlightenment. Stewart 
made Smith into the representative of a peculiar and innovative 
form of commercial rationality” (Brown, 2000, 149). 
Our present objective is not to reprise these literatures in all 
their detail, which in any event tend to be more familiar to 
historians in general than to economists and their fellow-travelers. 
It has more often than not struck us that contemporary social 
scientists prefer their historical accounts the way that Smith and 
his confreres liked them: abstract, Whiggish and unabashedly 
conjectural (or better, hasty, British and short). Rather, we 
propose to make use of the above-cited historians as a springboard 
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to pose a much narrower set of questions: how did it come to pass 
that the concerns of a very small number of writers situated in a 
political and economic backwater in the 18th century came to 
represent the very pith and moment of the modern, such that they 
were later credited with the invention of “political economy”? How 
was it that in their scrutiny of human endeavor in its supposed 
multi-faceted entirely, they ended up fragmenting ‘society’ into 
bits which could subsequently be molded into the objects of 
distinct ‘disciplines’? And how was it that, out of the multiple 
trajectories which the Scots projected their hopes and fears into 
the future, only one became graced with the honorific of 
modernity? 
In our quest, we are inspired by some of the themes raised in 
the science studies literature by Bruno Latour (1987). He has 
portrayed the activities of scientists as a circulation of fragile 
claims through networks of enrolled allies, turning local and 
highly contingent facts into solidly universal knowledge; fleeting 
particulars situated in time and space transmuted into ‘immutable 
mobiles’. We are concerned here to explore how some local 
reactions to parochial Caledonian concerns were eventually made 
to circulate as universal characterizations of human social life, or 
as a wag once put it, Scotland as a Model of the Predicament of All 
Mankind. To render this set of questions manageable, we shall 
decline to deal with the entire roster of the Scottish Enlightenment 
here, but whittle our cast of characters down to two: Sir James 
Steuart and Adam Smith. Smith is, of course, familiar to nearly 
everyone; Steuart is less known, and often omitted in surveys of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, but deserves better. By many 
accounts, including those in the 18th century, it was Steuart who 
deserved the laurels for the invention of political economy, 
publishing his Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy 
in 1767, almost a decade before Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Yet by 
the end of the century it was Smith who had enrolled the allies, 
and with a little help from his friends, sent the invisible hand 
gliding its way along the networks and across the globe.  
It will be our contention that it was not just the transparent 
attractions of the ‘simple system of natural liberty’ which explains 
the elevation of Adam Smith to pride of place in the genesis myth 
of the social science of political economy, while Steuart is 
consigned to obscurity. The groundings of the nascent discourse of 
political economy in the parochial concerns of the Scottish 
predicament had to undergo erasure before they could circulate 
outside of the Glasgow-Edinburgh orbit. Indeed, there were a 
whole series of erasures: natural law was deployed to erase civic 
humanism; conjectural history was recruited to erase documented 
history; university restructuring helped to erase the integration of 
knowledge; innate sentiments were evoked to erase traditional 
virtues; universalism was conjured to erase cosmopolitanism; and 
the British empire became a means to erase the political 
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subjugation of the Scots. Last but not least, Adam Smith explicitly 
erased James Steuart.2 
 
The Peculiar Predicament of 18th Century Scotland 
Scotland in the 18th century was in the unenviable position of 
being neighbor to its sometime enemy, the economically and 
militarily more powerful England.  Although the crowns of the two 
countries had been joined in 1603 by James V, there was little else 
the two nations shared.  Scotland had long maintained its own 
monarchy, parliament, constitution, and church.  The Scots shared 
economic ties with France, England’s traditional enemy, and 
educational ties with continental Europe, especially the 
universities of the Netherlands, rather than Oxford and Cambridge 
to the south.   Additionally, with the large Scots-Irish population 
in the north, the country also had a dissimilar linguistic and 
cultural background from England.  James V’s failed 17th century 
attempts to fully incorporate the two countries were resurrected by 
the English parliament at the outset of the 18th century and 
pursued with renewed force.  By 1705, the English parliament, 
fearful of both a Stuart restoration and invasion from France via 
Scotland, strongly endorsed a full incorporating union of the two 
nations.  Such pressure put Scotland in an even more precarious 
position, as the Scottish parliament was forced to choose between 
sovereignty and possible economic regeneration for their country. 
The Political and Economic Background    
In the 18th century Scotland seems always perched on the precipice 
of economic disaster.  Crop failures at the end of the 17th century 
contributed to famine in the largely agrarian nation.  The 1699 
failure of the Scottish colony of Darien in Panama further 
weakened confidence in the Scottish economy, and resulted in 
substantial losses for the company’s stockholders.  The Bank of 
Scotland faced several crises in 1703 and had shut down 
momentarily in December 1704.  In the meantime, England’s trade 
restrictions and continued wars with France severely limited 
Scotland’s ability to trade with its major partner, and contributed 
to the nation’s longstanding balance of trade problems.   
Reasserting themselves politically to put a halt to England’s 
continued pursuit of such measures, the Scots passed acts 
allowing them to pursue a separate foreign policy and to reject the 
Protestant succession, thereby creating the possibility of having a 
                                                        
2 Smith wrote to William Pulteney in 1772: “I have the same opinion of 
Sir James Steuart’s book that you have.  Without once mentioning it, I 
flatter myself that any fallacious principle in it will be met with a clear 
and distinct confutation in mine.” (Mossner & Ross 1977, 164). 
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separate successor to the throne of Scotland.3  Queen Anne and 
her ministers refused to approve either action, and began to argue 
more stridently for a full union.  Resistant to the idea of union and 
still lobbying for their acts to be signed, the Scottish ministers 
threatened to cut off supplies to the army.  In retaliation, the 
English passed the Alien Act of 1705, which declared Scots in 
England to be aliens and their property forfeit if the Scots did not 
consent to discuss an incorporating union.  The Act also decreed 
that Scottish cattle, linen, and other products would be banned 
from English markets. Under such economic and political 
pressure the talks for Union were opened in the Scottish 
Parliament in 1706.  
Amidst much politicking and bribery, the Act of Union passed 
in 1707, fully incorporating the nations and passing the crown to 
the German Hanover line upon the death of Queen Anne.  The 
decision was made neither quickly nor without much debate.  The 
arguments on both sides were heavily influenced by the economic 
situation of Scotland.   Pro-Unionists believed that union would 
provide free trade, increased investment in Scotland, and access to 
the resources and markets of the English overseas colonies, which 
they felt would quickly reverse Scotland’s fortunes.  Anti-
Unionists felt access to other markets would do little to help 
Scotland, whose goods were not competitive with England’s 
anyway, and proposed a federal union of republics to maintain 
some semblance of Scottish sovereignty.  Although the majority of 
the Scots were opposed to Union, in end many ministers were 
swayed by the thought that, given Scotland’s feeble economic 
situation, the saving grace of the union would be the saving grace 
of Scotland as well: access to the markets of England and her 
overseas dominions.   
However, the fact remained that Scotland had been a separate 
nation with separate customs and institutions.  On the matter of 
representation alone, the Union required a vast psychological shift 
for the Scots.  The Scottish parliament was to be dissolved and the 
joint parliament moved to London.  Whereas the Scots were used 
to extensive local representation in their independent kingdom, 
having 239 peers in their parliament, the Union parliament 
allowed for only 16 Scottish peers in the House of Lords and 45 in 
the Commons.  Scottish parliamentarians also had to take oaths of 
abjuration against the Scottish Stuart kings and the Church of 
Scotland, and oaths of allegiance to the German Hanoverian king 
as well as the Church of England.  These measures were 
controversial to many, to say the least. 
In the meantime, the Scots had to adjust to English trade laws 
and other financial decrees issued by the English-dominated 
parliament.  While union did bring increased public and private 
                                                        
3 Respectively, the Act Anent Peace and War (1703) and the Act of 
Security (1703). 
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capital into Scotland and opened markets for Scottish exports in 
the long run, it did not fulfill its promises as quickly as had been 
hoped or promised.    According to the estimates of economic 
historian TC Smout (1964 & 1983) economic growth took place in 
Scotland only in the last fifty years of the eighteenth century.  
Prices of livestock and wool increased from 1749-1790, due largely 
to increased demand from the British navy, rendering husbandry 
more profitable than manual labor.  Thus landlords were 
encouraged to clear the land of tenant families for grazing.  The 
clearance policy was most widespread in the Highlands where it 
also served the expedient political purpose of dismantling the clan 
system, as has been explored by MacInnes (1996).   Another 
problem for many Scots was now not dearth but a surplus of 
agricultural goods, which had to be destroyed both for lack of 
demand and transportation to market.  There was little change in 
the living standards of the majority of Scots, except in the 
Highlands where conditions became steadily worse after the 
clearances. Dissatisfaction with the economic outcomes of the 
union continued to be an issue for many.   
The Jacobites and the Union 
The union of parliaments, therefore, did not allay the strife 
between the two countries.  Opposition not only to the House of 
Hanover, but also to the increased taxation imposed to finance 
England’s continued wars with France, led commoners and nobles 
alike to support the 1708 and 1715 Jacobite uprisings to restore the 
Stuart king James III, both of which failed.  Several attempts were 
made politically to repeal the union, most notably in 1713, but also 
failed.  Discontent continued to grow, culminating in the 1745 
Jacobite rebellion.  With French and Spanish assistance, Prince 
Charles Edward Stuart led a campaign that drew followers from 
England and Scotland and from across class boundaries.4  Initially 
successful, Charles and his men captured Edinburgh and pushed 
south to England.  However, poor planning and lack of promised 
aid from the French resulted in the defeat of Charles’ army at the 
disastrous Battle of Culloden in 1746. 
 
The Reform of the Universities and the Construction of a 
Modern Curriculum 
In the midst of these political, economic, and military events, great 
changes were also afoot in the Scottish universities, which 
implemented reforms in the early 18th century to abandon the 
regenting system.  Under the regenting system every entering class 
of students would be led through their courses and university life 
by a single professor who taught all subjects and oversaw the 
                                                        
4 Among James’s and Charles’s promises were religious tolerance, an 
alleviation of taxation, amnesty for those who had not supported them, 
and repeal of the union (“Declaration” 1974, 234-237). 
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students’ daily life in the dormitories.  The regent was also 
responsible for providing individual instruction to each of his 
students and for taking an active interest in the students’ personal 
and spiritual development.  Every class spent not only their lecture 
time together, but also all meal, study, and sleeping times.  Indeed, 
as Camic (1983) notes “The pupils of any one regent shared still 
more: the full daily round of prayers, dictations, exercises, meals, 
study halls, recreational periods, and the like” (173). 
Although previously proposed in the 17th century, it was not 
until 1708 that the Edinburgh Town Council passed the reform to 
replace regenting with a professorial system.5  Rather than 
teaching the same class several subjects, the new system required 
professors to specialize in subjects that could be taught to students 
of any year6. Financially, the increase in possible electives meant 
increased money to the university and to professors, who were 
paid by students on a class-by-class basis.  Concurrent with this 
reform, the universities loosened requirements for students to live 
and take their meals on campus, as it was becoming too expensive 
for the colleges to provide room and board for the increasing 
numbers of students (Camic 1983; Emerson 2003, 19-20; Gaillet 
1994).   
Interestingly, the Scottish universities instituted reforms not 
only of what courses were taught, but also in what language.  
Although there was no general proclamation that they must do so, 
professors began to replace Latin with English as the language of 
instruction.7 While this established English as the language of 
civility and learning, it also had the consequence of weakening the 
ties Scotland had fostered with the Continental universities, 
especially those in the  Netherlands, whose curricula remained 
Latin-based (Jones 1983 108). 
Although it makes sense to begin with the university system 
for the emergence of political economy from moral philosophy, as 
we should expect to see the offering of new classes to students as a 
major reason why economics separated from moral philosophy, 
the first chair in political economy was not founded until 1802 
when Dugald Stewart held that post at Edinburgh.  Until then, 
economics courses were still under the purview of the department 
of moral philosophy.  Therefore, a gap of some years remains 
between the mid-eighteenth century, when political economy 
                                                        
5 The other universities passed similar reforms in the following years: 
Glasgow 1727, St Andrews 1747, MarischalCollege  1753, King’s College 
1789 (Emerson 2003, 19). 
6 For instance, Edinburgh had a core of four arts classes taught by the 
Prof of Humanity: Greek, logic and metaphysics and Ethics & Natural 
Philosophy to which electives could be added (Wood 1994, 101).  
7 Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith’s mentor, was among the first 
proponents of such a move (Jones 1983, 108). 
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began to be written about and the end of the century, when the 
political economy chair was established.   
Union, University, and Uniformity 
Rather than looking for political economy before its time in the 
university, closer attention should be paid to the consequences of 
the university reforms on the history of ideas, and specifically the 
emergence of economics.  The reforms display a continuing 
pattern in 18th century Scottish intellectual and social life.  
Although perhaps never explicitly taught in the university, the new 
structure of academic life necessarily deemphasized community 
and placed a greater weight on individual experience.  For 
instance, students were no longer outwardly seen to be part of one 
cohort spending all academic and social time in common, but as 
individuals who took courses and lived independently, not only of 
their fellows, but also of strict tutorial oversight as personalized, 
paternal instruction by the regents was also abandoned. 
The originating thread of this pattern is in the Union 
propaganda itself, which disregarded Scotland’s separate political 
and cultural identity outside that of Great Britain, and encouraged 
Scots to see themselves as “North Britons.”  In general, the 
university faculty decried the Jacobite rebellion and supported the 
cultural aims of the Union government.8  For most professors,  
Jacobitism meant a return to the feudal state from which 
the Lowlands were just now emerging.  The Highlanders 
represented an atavisitic challenge to modern polite 
values, with which the professors themselves were most 
closely associated.  Consequently they were absolutely 
committed to the Hanoverian cause and the Union with 
England...(Jones 115).  
The acquiescence of the faculty with the goal of integrating the 
Scottish culture into the “British” can be seen in the effects of the 
university reforms.  Just as Scotland was no longer to be seen as a 
separate nation with a separate monarchy, but a member of a 
“United Kingdom,” university students were not part of separate 
cohorts, but were instead individual members of the university.  
Their courses of study also became more specialized, as they could 
take more electives than before and were not necessarily bound to 
the studies of their year group.  Reforms in curriculum and 
student life allowed for increased student independence both 
intellectually and socially, allowing students to think in 
universalist rather than parochial terms.  According to Camic 
(1983) this was previously impossible due to the lack of uniform 
standards for students; standards were at the discretion of a class’s 
                                                        
8 At the University of Glasgow in particular, the professors were 
staunchly in support of the Hanoverian monarchy and issued 
congratulations to George II at the news of the defeat of the Jacobites at 
Culloden (Jones 1983, 115). 
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particular regent.  Although there were still personal biases, 
professors were now too busy with multiple classes to grant 
individualized tutoring and assessment, and uniform standards 
were introduced (183-184).   
However, the new universalist mode of thought entailed more 
than just new standards and the uniform treatment of peoples.  
The change of university practice and pedagogy also altered the 
role of the university in Scottish civic life.  Formerly united in the 
goal of producing educated, patriotic, public-spirited gentlemen, 
the universities were now preoccupied with instructing students 
on the internalized concerns of civility and sentiment (Jones 116).  
Rather than reflection on one’s own community, such an outlook 
required a dislocation of attention from local problems in favor of 
a consideration of distant “others” whose situations had to be 
conjectured.  This was a logical outcome of the intellectual and 
political atmosphere after the union that focused on the need to 
think outside of one’s concerns and to join a wider civil society.   
It was in this atmosphere that the nascent social sciences were 
to reconceive many of their notions of what constituted a civil 
society and the proper role of a civilized government.  The Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers were thus occupied by a project that 
would complete what the Union of 1707 had begun.  Just as 
assimilation and uniformity of parliaments and markets were the 
political and economic goals of the Union, so then did uniformity, 
propriety, and civility become the intellectual and social goals for 
those Scots who sought recognition from their English 
counterparts, who continued to regard them as second-class 
citizens.  In order to attain this uniformity for themselves and for 
all of mankind, the enlighteners needed to find a way in which 
they were the same as their English counterparts.  Therefore, the 
promoters of modern civility focused on the universality of human 
nature.  If human nature was the same everywhere, then civility 
and thus progress was also everywhere possible.   
“Civility” was to be accomplished in Scotland and elsewhere by 
a deliberate shift in thought, language, and government.  Where 
there was to be moderation and centralization in government, 
there was to be propriety in society, uniformity in language, and in 
the economy, equilibrium.  This constructed uniformity had 
another unexpected effect, which was an eventual rift between 
politics, economics, and moral philosophy.  Both the predilection 
for uniformity, as well as the segmentation of subjects in Scottish 
intellectual life, are paralleled in the various works of Adam 
Smith’s system of natural liberty: The Lectures on Jurisprudence 
demonstrate how an enlightened people dispense benevolence; 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments9 shows how civilized people are 
to interact and moralize; the Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-
                                                        
9 Hereafter cited as TMS. 
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Lettres show how the civilized are to speak and write10; and, 
perhaps most famously, the Wealth of Nations11 shows how a 
civilized commercial society operates.   
It is curious that the reform the universities made partially for 
economic reasons also demonstrated what is later lauded in the 
WN: the breaking apart of traditional communal society into a 
collection of specialized individuals for increased efficiency, 
choice, and production.  What this meant for the development of 
political economy is the abandonment of both traditional 
community-based notions of progress and attention to particular 
cultures in favor of universal rules.   
In the case of Smith, political economy can be seen as part of 
the civilizing process.12  The emergence of political economy as a 
topic, however, can be read in more general terms as a response to 
both the economic changes and the persistence of the economic 
problems experienced by the Scots in the 18th century.  Scotland’s 
post-Union situation reveals several repeated concerns regarding 
economic growth, surpluses of goods, money and banking, and the 
problems posed by having policy dictated by the non-local and 
uninterested central government in London rather than the local 
one in Edinburgh.  The first work to deal with these issues as a 
separate discipline is not that of Adam Smith, but of another Scot 
less well-known today, Sir James Steuart, whose An Inquiry Into 
the Principles of Political Economy was published in 1767.    
The Repressed Innovator: Sir James Steuart 
The story of Steuart, author of the first English language treatise 
on economics as a subject, and its removal from the canon, is also 
intimately tied to the story of the emergence of political economy 
as a modern social science.  Born into an aristocratic family in 
Edinburgh, Steuart trained as a lawyer with the ambition of 
entering politics.  However, an unfortunate early disagreement 
with Henry Dundas of Arniston not only kept Steuart out of local 
politics, but also caused him to spend an extended five years on 
the Continent on the Grand Tour.  While there, his interest in 
economic matters was piqued by the very different conditions of 
the countries he visited.   
                                                        
10 Smith here equates proper language with English, specifically that of 
the English court: “Our words must not only be English and agreeable to 
the customs of the country but likewise to the custom of some particular 
part of the nation.  This part undoubtedly is formed of the men of rank 
and breeding…As those of the higher rank generally frequent the court, 
the standard of our language is therefore chiefly to be met with there” 
(1983, 4-5). 
11 Hereafter cited as WN 
12 Smith was a supporter of the Union and its benefits for Scotland (Ross 
1995).  In the WN the positive effects of the Union on the prices of 
Scottish wheat and cattle are discussed mostly in Bk I, XI, part iii. 
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It was also on the Grand Tour that Steuart became acquainted 
with the exiled Stuart court in Rome.  James II and the young 
Prince Charles Edward made a great impression on Steuart and 
vice versa.  When he returned to Scotland, he participated in 
planning for the rebellion at his estate, which became a meeting 
place for the Jacobites.  During the rebellion, Steuart served in 
France as a writer, advisor, and ambassador for the Stuart court.  
After Culloden, he was charged with treason and forced to live in 
exile on the Continent for the next eighteen years (Coltness 
Collections 1842; Skinner 1966a & 1999a; Steuart 1967). 
Therefore, Steuart was writing, not necessarily in isolation, but 
certainly detached from many of the currents in Scottish 
academia.  However, an academic influence was still present at the 
outset of his work.  Steuart began to draft the Principles in 
earnest while in the German university town of Tübingen, where 
he and his family had moved in the early 1750s for his son to 
attend university.  A congenial host, Steuart spent many evenings 
in “the mutual communication of ideas” with the professors of 
Tübingen, and also visited the other schools in the duchy of 
Wurtemburg (Coltness Collections 306-308).13  It was here that 
Steuart came into contact with the doctrines of cameralism, which 
greatly influenced the Principles. 
Despite not being officially pardoned until 1771, Steuart returned 
to Scotland in 1763, and settled into the social life of the city, 
joining several of the literary and social clubs that abounded there.  
The Principles was published in 1767 and sold at a steady pace.  
Into the 1770s, Steuart was seen as the authority on economics, 
serving as an advisor to the East India Company on the coin of 
Bengal and cited in the Encyclopedia Britannica, and yet in the 
early 19th century mention of Steuart falls out of the canon.  It 
could be argued that Steuart’s Jacobitism is the problem, given the 
political atmosphere of Hanoverian England, but his book itself 
also posed many problems for those at the forefront of the 
Enlightenment project of civility.  
 
The Principles of Political Economy14 
Steuart’s book has been read as many things: the apotheosis of 
mercantilism (Anderson and Tollison 1984); an argument for the 
economics of state control (Sen 1957; Meek 1958); and a work 
approaching the themes of the Wealth of Nations (Skinner 1966b).  
                                                        
13 Although he had also lived in France and was familiar with the works of 
the French physiocrats, Steuart did not adopt physiocratic positions in 
his own work.   Most likely this is because the first part of the Principles 
was completed by 1759, prior to the widespread circulation of the 
physiocratic works (Skinner 1999, 140).   
14 All references herein are to the 1966 edition, unless otherwise noted. 
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Given the evidence above about Scotland’s economic and political 
situation it would be willful to assume that these events had no 
influence on Steuart in his writing of the Principles.  The 
Principles, and therefore political economy, can be read as a 
response to the particular problems of 18th century Scotland writ 
large.  Elements in Steuart’s background combine to support this 
reading, namely his family’s tendency towards Scottish patriotism, 
his own activities in the ’45, and the themes that are emphasized 
in the Principles itself.  Reading the work in this context, what 
emerges is a version of political economy that is counter to the 
universalist trend, and hence, to accepted 18th century ideas of 
civility and progress. 
It is important to remember that when Steuart wrote the 
Principles he was not part of the academic establishment in 
Scotland, and, although he did have academic connections in 
Germany, he had no apparent interest in becoming a professor.  
Rather, Steuart’s ambition from youth was to be a politician and 
he stood to be well-placed in the hoped-for Jacobite state.15  
Instead of looking to academia, one should look to Steuart’s 
politics to see what influenced him to write this particular text at 
this particular time. 
Skinner (1999) asks, but does not answer, the very pertinent 
question as to whether Steuart’s preferred state is for an 
independent Scotland.  As noted above, Steuart came from a long 
line of patriots and politicians.  Although his forefathers did not 
always show an affinity for the House of Stuart, they did often 
show their willingness to stand up for their political beliefs, and a 
marked loyalty to Scotland as a nation.16  Steuart’s involvement in 
the 1745 rebellion shows a continuity of belief with his forefathers.  
The manifestoes he coauthored for Charles and James speak of the 
“pretended union between the two nations,” and the “unlawful 
government” under which the national debt was contracted, which 
will be dissolved on the restoration of the Stuarts (“Declaration” 
1974, 234-237). 
As an aspiring politician for an independent Scotland, Steuart 
must have already had ideas on how an economy for a nation such 
as Scotland should operate.  It is not surprising then to find the 
economic and political situation of Scotland reflected, although 
                                                        
15 According to his aunt Elizabeth Mure, he was slated to become “the 
first man in the state” had the rebellion succeeded (Chamley 1965, 115-
116). 
16 His greatgrandfather, grandfather, and two great uncles were all 
subject to exile or political persecution at various times in the 17th century 
(Coltness Collections 1842).  At the time of the Union debates, Steuart’s 
grandfather, the Lord Advocate James Steuart authored a protest speech 
to be read in a failed walk-out of Parliament , which states that the Union 
was nothing more than coercion and  Scotland should maintain her 
sovereignty (Lockhart 1714, 295-299). 
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never explicitly referred to, in the pages of the Principles of 
Political Economy.  Among Steuart’s major themes that parallel 
Scottish concerns are: the need for population to not outstrip 
agriculture (Bk I), the formation of markets (Bk II), the need to 
balance goods produced with demand for them (Bk II, Ch X), and 
the development and proper uses of trade, public credit, taxation, 
and money and banking (Bks III-V).   
Steuart defines political economy as a science whose object, 
…is to secure a certain fund of subsistence for all the 
inhabitants, to obviate every circumstance which may 
render it precarious; to provide everything necessary for 
supplying the wants of the society, and to employ the 
inhabitants…so as to make their several interests lead 
them to supply one another with their reciprocal wants 
(1966, 17). 
He traces the development of the modern economy from the 
hunter-gatherer stage to the agrarian, where, when there is an 
agricultural surplus, some are able to leave farming to enter 
manufacturing, leading to the modern exchange economy.  Steuart 
then posits a two-sector society of farmers and “freehands,” or 
those who do not work to produce the agricultural surplus.  A 
balance is needed between these groups so that the needs of one 
never outstrip the other.  The need for balance is then extended to 
markets in general, in terms of supply and demand, as society 
develops more complex commercial relations, and then to 
international markets.               
The great spur to economic growth from the agrarian to 
the manufacturing stage, after the existence of the surplus, 
is the demand for manufactures.  After the agrarian stage, 
and in the presence of a continued surplus, demand 
continues to push the economy to higher stages of 
development. Therefore, the emphasis throughout is on an 
increase in the economic welfare of a nation through 
increases in demand.17    
Steuart’s work is also concerned with the social problems posed by 
the economic development of a nation.  Balance is also needed on 
a social level, so there will not be too wide a divergence between 
the classes of society, such that one would have greater political 
power over another.  Unemployment is seen as a failure of the 
state to ensure that the conditions are in place for all who seek 
work to be able to make a living.  Therefore, a balance of workers 
and employment is also necessary.   
                                                        
17 Coincidentally the same policy was emphasized by the anti-Unionists 
Andrew Fletcher and James, Duke of Hamilton in the debates in 
Parliament as to how Scotland could survive economically without full 
union with England (see Clerk 1993, Defoe 1799, Lockhart 1714).   
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Although the foundation for his economy is self-interest, Steuart 
does not believe that private self-interest will naturally conform to 
the public good.  He writes that, “It is the combination of every 
private interest which forms the public good,” and so one should 
seek to provide for oneself but avoid unlawful gain (143).   
However, to expect men to do so all the time is “absurd” and so 
Steuart invests the statesman with the power of safeguarding the 
public good (144).  The statesman oversees the many balances of 
society and economy: balances of work and demand; of the classes 
of society; of wealth among those classes; of international and 
inland trade; and of frugality and luxury, among others.  This 
aspect of Steuart’s work has been one of the most severely 
criticized, as many of his contemporary, and even current, 
reviewers see the statesman as an absolutist ruler (Blaug 1986, 
241-242; Anonymous 1767, 412).  However, in Steuart’s own 
definition of this “individual”:     
The statesman (this is a general term to signify the 
legislature and supreme power, according to the form of 
government) is neither master to establish what oeconomy 
he pleases, or, in the exercise of his sublime authority, to 
overturn at will the established laws of it, let him be the 
most despotic monarch upon earth (16). 
The author’s underlying assumption is that the combination of 
commerce and self-interest will lead naturally to disorder; there 
are no self-adjusting mechanisms.  Therefore, intervention is 
necessary to rectify what will inevitably go awry, whether for 
consumers or for industry.  Only the statesman’s presence and 
ability ensure that markets are sufficiently developed and kept 
competitive.  
In order to know when to intervene, the statesman not only 
has to have a great amount of knowledge of a people’s history, 
customs, and natural resources, but also of current opinion and 
economic conditions.  Steuart has been criticized for the sheer 
amount of knowledge required the statesman must master to 
perfectly time the execution of his policies.  Such knowledge would 
be implausible if one is analyzing an extensive state or empire with 
a developed economy.  However, Steuart’s conclusions are not so 
illogical given that the cameralist theories that influenced him 
were written for the kingdoms of the Rhineland, which were small 
relative to their English and French counterparts, and Steuart 
himself was most familiar with the many smaller countries he 
traveled to, and wrote with Scotland in mind. 
In giving the statesman such oversight, Steuart cannot 
logically separate politics from economics and does not seek to do 
so.  In this, the influence of the German cameralists rather than 
the Scottish or French enlighteners is the most telling.  Although 
he was a Scotsman educated at Edinburgh, and was friends with 
Hume as well as other Scottish literati, Steuart intellectually is not 
part of the Scottish Enlightenment.  Having attained further 
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education at Leyden and Utrecht, and having spent many years in 
Germany, Steuart can be seen to fit more comfortably in the Dutch 
and German Enlightenments, which stressed gradual reform 
within the established order (Schama 1981; Whaley 1981).  The 
local magistrates of the Netherlands and the very local kings of 
Germany are very much akin to the very involved and 
knowledgeable statesman in the Principles.18  Unsurprisingly, 
Steuart’s book was warmly received in Germany, not only due to 
its cameralist influence, but also because it is suited to smaller 
nation-states.  Likewise, the Irish edition of the Principles sold 
well in Ireland and was also widely circulated in the American 
colonies (Skinner 1999a, 148).  However, as stated above, in the 
19th century Steuart fell out of the English canon of the history of 
economic thought.  The reason why this is so has to do with both 
the deliberate and unintentional effects of several movements in 
18th and 19th century Scotland and England and their effects on 
Steuart and his  rival, Adam Smith. 
A Universe of Invisible Connections 
To Smith, Steuart’s principles would indeed seem “fallacious” as 
he wrote to Pulteney.  Calling for policymakers to be not only 
interventionist, but also attached to history and location, as 
Steuart’s work does, is anathema to Smith’s project of civility 
founded on universalism.  Therefore in order to proceed to 
examine the nature and causes of the progress of nations from 
primitivism to modern commercial civility from the universalist 
standpoint, Smith had to both explicitly and implicitly erase the 
concerns of Steuart.  In order to do so, Smith had to use not only a 
different method from Steuart, but also one that would allow him 
to remodel society in such a way that people would be connected 
by bonds that were neither nationally nor historically contingent.  
Overall, he had to counter the large role played by history in the 
Principles.  Fortunately for Smith, he had already laid the 
foundation for such a study in his works previous to the WN. 
Steuart’s Historical Methodology 
For Steuart, history plays a vital role in the possibilities for 
economic growth and development.  Not only does history 
determine the resources and capabilities at a nation’s disposal, but 
also the disposition of the people towards economic and political 
change.  The all-important “Spirit of the People,” made of 
manners, government, and morals, are formed by history and are 
to be studied in the present and the past: morals are to be found in 
a people’s religion and from “what is taught among them by 
authority”; government is to be determined from a “thorough 
knowledge of their history, and conversation with their ministers 
                                                        
18 Again it was the Dutch republics, with their more interventionist 
Magistrates, that Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun advocated in the Union 
debates as a model that an independent Scotland should follow (see 
Clerk, 1993, Fletcher 1997, Lockhart 1714). 
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of state…;”  manners are formed over time and, he admits, are the 
hardest to acquire but are “the most open to every person’s 
observation” (22).  A people’s openness to a change in economic 
and institutional structures then is dependent on their history, and 
this must be known by the statesman before he attempts any 
policy change (23-25).  Therefore, history and fact are necessarily 
important to the science of political economy.   
Given Steuart’s political background, the emphasis on history 
and fact throughout the Principles is not unexpected.  The Act of 
Union could not erase the fact that Scotland had been an 
independent kingdom with its own traditions and economy.  
Likewise, Steuart’s experience in several different countries and 
with the differing political worlds of Scotland and the Jacobite 
court showed him that men and their histories are different and 
such differences influenced the direction of a nation’s economy.  
Recognition of historical and present facts resurface in Steuart’s 
work and is a reminder that Scotland’s past mattered if one was to 
find a viable future for her and other smaller nations like her.  
Therefore one of the required tools of an able statesman or 
political economist is a thorough knowledge of history. 
Such a view of history has a clear effect on Steuart’s 
methodology.  Steuart seeks to educate politicians and the general 
public on the possibilities and practicalities of economic policy.  As 
quoted above, the goal of Steuart’s fledgling science is to provide a 
means of subsistence for the people and a means of employment 
for those who want it (12).19  The problems that faced Scotland and 
other underdeveloped countries and territories are for him 
necessarily better served by practical and visible solutions than 
philosophic systems, as is communicated in his methodology. 
Perhaps influenced by Hume, Steuart’s method, as discussed 
in the Preface, is dependent on empiricism.  Concurring with 
Newton, he rejects reasoning from hypotheses and uses objective 
observation as a starting point.  Principles are then derived by 
induction, and consequences then deduced from the resulting 
phenomena.  Despite the charms he sees in purely deductive 
reasoning, Steuart warns against pure deduction and “falling into 
what the French call systêmes,” as such “long steps in political 
reasoning lead to error…” (17 & 19).  In each case under 
consideration, he builds from simple principles to applications to 
more complex situations, as in the movement from the simple 
exchange economy to international trade. 
Due to the vagaries of human nature and history, Steuart 
states that his work is contingent on circumstances (5 & 19).  
Therefore, he does not believe in general rules and offers general 
                                                        
19 The author is aware that he is embarking on a new project in trying to 
form the myriad subject matter of political economy into a regular 
science, and acknowledges that his work is a first step, a “canvas” for 
other writers to improve upon (7). 
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principles only.  Similarly, Newton admitted that his natural laws 
were provisional and that some measure of divine intervention 
was necessary to maintain the equilibrium of the physical world, 
that “The process of analysis was unending: general principles, 
even Newton’s principle of gravitation, could never be other than 
provisional” (Sambrook 3). 20  Combined with the unpredictability 
of human nature, Steuart’s belief in the divine economy being 
mirrored in the household and that of the household in the state, 
and Newton’s caveat, Steaurt’s belief in the necessity for 
government intervention does not seem farfetched in the context 
of 18th century science. 
As he is telling a story of progress, like many of his 18th century 
contemporaries, Steuart uses conjectural history at the beginning 
of his book to explain the rise of modern commercial society.  So 
named by Dugald Stewart, conjectural history involves making 
educated guesses as to how mankind developed from its earliest 
stages to the present.  Steuart conjectures three stages of economic 
development: the hunter-gatherer, the agrarian, and the exchange 
economy of the present day.  In the last stage, farmers produce an 
agricultural surplus, freeing some to pursue manufacturing, and 
allowing increases in population, which further spur demand, and 
so increase production.  
Relying on facts and his vast store of observations from his 
travels at home and abroad, Steuart does not use conjecture in the 
rest of his work.  In fact, he seeks “to avoid abstraction as much as 
possible” (19), and purposely uses shorter steps of reasoning to 
keep “experience and matter of fact before our eyes” (1967, 121).  
In terms of methodology then, although he is theorizing about an 
abstract object, political economy, reliance on facts makes 
Steuart’s theory historically and spatially contingent and the 
objects of his analysis are both measurable and observable. 
Smith and the Conjectural Method 
Steuart’s approach to history and method poses a general problem 
to the universalist project, and a specific problem in a country 
trying to replace a past reality of two nations with the present 
entity of Great Britain.21  As a moral philosophy professor within 
the Scottish university system, supporter of the union, and one 
opposed to what he saw as backward patriotism displayed in the 
Jacobite rebellion, Adam Smith necessarily takes a different 
approach from Steuart, not only to his history, but also to his 
                                                        
20 Newton knew that there was some planetary behavior that his laws 
could not explain and therefore there must be some measure of divine 
intervention present to maintain the integrity of the system (Sambrook  
1993, 3). 
21 As Robertson (2000) notes, of the Scottish enlighteners who analysed 
political economy, “only the former Jacobite exile Sir James Steuart ever 
specifically addressed the problems of the Scottish economy” (45). 
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science.22  In order to produce his universal system Smith needs to 
liberate people from history and must uproot it.  Therefore he will 
not rely on facts, but will draw his conclusions from something 
universal to mankind: human nature.23 
While Smith’s views on science, philosophy, and methodology 
are not explicitly stated in the WN, they are made clear elsewhere 
in Smith’s system of natural liberty.  In The Principles Which Lead 
and Direct Philosophical Inquiries: Illustrated by the History of 
Astronomy, Smith defines philosophy as “the science of the 
connecting principles of nature,” which allows the mind to reach a 
state of “tranquility” and “admiration” (1967, 45).  Rather than 
establishing truth or fact, philosophy’s focus is to soothe the mind.  
In the History of Astronomy Smith hopes to uncover the nature 
and causes of the Wonder, Surprise, and Admiration one 
experiences when an unsettling event occurs where unrelated 
objects or events follow one another: 
When one accustomed object appears after another, which 
it does not follow, it first excites, by its unexpectedness, 
the sentiment properly called Surprise, and afterwards, by 
the singularity of the succession, or order of its 
appearance, the sentiment properly called Wonder.  We 
start and are surprised at seeing it there, and then wonder 
how it came there (39). 
However, philosophy can help us to find the connections between 
such events, “join them together by a sort of bridge” and therefore 
soothe our disquieted minds (1967, 40).  The “Admiration” Smith 
seeks comes about after invisible connections between the 
phenomena have been found:    
Philosophy, by representing the invisible chains which 
bind together all these disjointed objects, endeavors to 
introduce order into this chaos of jarring and discordant 
appearances, to allay this tumult of the imagination, and 
to restore it, when it surveys the great revolutions of the 
universe, to that tone of tranquility and composure, which 
is both most agreeable in itself, and most suitable to its 
nature (45).  
Tranquility and admiration therefore occur once philosophy has 
imposed order on the events being observed.  Order then 
                                                        
22 Smith writes unflatteringly of the ’45 rebellion and the Jacobites in the 
Lectures on Jurisprudence (1982, 431 & 451).  His dislike of the 
Jacobites, starting in his Oxford days, has been well noted by Rae (1895) 
and Ross (1995). 
23 As has been discussed by Poovey (1998), such a move also allows Smith 
to deal with the problem of induction: that observed particulars could not 
be concluded to be the same as particulars to be observed in the future.  
Unchangeable human nature is seen by Smith as a superior basis for 
scientific inquiry (214-218). 
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continues to be a topic of some importance to Smith.  He examines 
systems of nature to see how each is “…fitted to sooth the 
imagination, and to render the theatre of nature a more coherent, 
and therefore a more magnificent spectacle, than otherwise it 
would have appeared to be” (1967, 45-46).  Again, in the idea that 
invisible connections as yet uncover-ed will fill the gap between 
two seemingly opposed objects, one can observe the extension of 
the political assimilationist mindset to the philosophical realm.  
Smith’s mental universe of Cartesian vortices allows his 
scientific and philosophical systems to be reasoned from the mind 
alone.  He admits that philosophical systems are “mere inventions 
of the imagination” (108) and “imaginary machine[s] invented to 
connect together in the fancy those different movements and 
effects which are already in reality performed” (66).  Further he 
intends to study them, “without regarding their absurdity or 
probability, their agreement or inconsistency with truth and 
reality” (45-46).   
Although Smith can be said to agree with Newton in his 
assessment of the importance of first principles, his methodology 
is far from Newtonian.  Empiricism and induction are remarkable 
here only in their absence.  Rather, as Poovey (1998) contends, 
Smith’s methodology can be characterized as another kind of 
conjectural history.  In order to explain and connect seemingly 
unrelated events, Smith must abstract and speculate to determine 
the invisible connections that join them (238-239).  Resting on 
hypotheses, unobservables, and resulting in principles that are 
common sense, Smith’s method is rooted in neither history nor 
observed fact.   
Such an uprooting is compatible with the creation of a 
universal system of science, and economic science in particular.  
Smith needs to find a way to distance men from their local 
concerns and attachments so they can begin to think in broader 
scope.  The system must be such that those who use it can imagine 
its use in distant places.  Also, however, the object of his analysis 
itself must also be imagined, and therefore abstract.  Whereas 
Steuart begins his work with two observables, population and the 
agricultural surplus, Smith begins the WN with the study of two 
intangibles: the division of labour and the market system. As 
abstractions that evolve from a conjectured history, these entities 
are not rooted in any one particular time, place or culture. Smith’s 
conjectural method frees one from having to ground analysis in 
historical fact, thereby allowing one to set aside time and place.  
Therefore for Scotland’s particular problems can be forgotten and 
Smith’s political economy universally applied.  Rather than 
generalizing the situation of Scotland to other countries, as 
Steuart did, Smith instead generalizes human nature, rendering 
the rational Scotsman as a generalized, universal man. 
Although this move allows him to sidestep Steuart’s emphasis 
on history and location, Smith still needs to connect the members 
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of commercial society in order to cast aside Steuart’s assumption 
of traditional social obligation and religion.  Therefore, he needs to 
find invisible social connections in the social realm as well as the 
commercial. 
Diversity and Universalism 
In its infancy, the science of political economy does not address 
national revenue and provisioning alone.  It also must address the 
impact of the changes in social relations that increased 
commercialism had wrought.  At the time Steuart began to write 
the Principles, there was a strong tension between the social bonds 
of the traditional feudal past and the commercial bonds of 
modernity.  Therefore, before exploring how states and individuals 
should conduct commerce, Steuart and Smith both have to 
address the vital subjects of the roles of individuals in society and 
of the actions of individuals within society before they can explore 
how people should interact in commercial life. 
 Steuart and Cosmopolitanism 
As an empiricist, the facts of history do not allow Steuart to 
subscribe to the notions of universal human nature or general 
economic policies.  He begins his analysis with the 
acknowledgment that all peoples, nations, and cultures are 
different (20).  In a cosmopolitan spirit, Steuart frequently 
reminds the reader that the successful enaction of policy in any 
country is going to depend on the spirit of the people and that 
nation's particular circumstances, whether historical, political, 
social, or natural.  Due to these differences, Steuart believes that 
every country will have its own political economy: 
If one considers the variety which is found in different 
countries, in the distribution of property, subordination of 
classes, genius of people proceeding from the variety of 
forms of government, laws, climate, and manners, one 
may conclude, that the political economy of each must 
necessarily be different (1966, 17). 
In the 18th century, this cosmopolitan aspect of Steuart's work was 
one of its most contested features, as it was not consistent with 
English norms.  For instance, the anonymous reviewer from the 
Monthly Review of 1767 claims that Steuart had been “imbibing 
prejudices abroad by no means consistent with the present state of 
England and the genius of Englishmen” (Monthly Review, 465).  
Unfortunately the reviewers missed Steuart’s point, which he 
gamely reiterates in the corrected edition of the Principles: 
If from this work, I have any merit at all, it is by divesting 
myself of English notions, so far as to be able to expose in a fair 
light, the sentiments and policy of foreign nations, relatively to 
their own situation (1966, 4-5). 
Particular situations are important because, as stated in the 
Principles’s first chapter, man is alike in all times, countries and 
climes only in acting “from the principles of self-interest, duty or 
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passion.  In this he is alike, in nothing else”(20).  Due to their 
social nature, men form governments and nations, which differ 
over time and place, due to differences in motivation.  Not only 
does Steuart lack the principle common to the Scottish 
enlightenment of universal human nature, but he also assumes 
traditional religion. 
Therefore, when it comes to morality, there is no need for him 
to produce, as Smith did prior to the WN, a separate theory of 
moral sentiments; morality is left to a nation’s particular spirit.  As 
stated above, morals are contained in the spirit of the people, and 
these are formed by religion and authority, which are themselves 
formed over history.   
Duty, which is also formed by history, is another major 
determining factor of morality.  Indeed, Steuart says that “the 
characteristic of a good action consists in the conformity between 
the motive, and the duty of the agent” (11).  Therefore, when one 
has a duty to more than oneself, self-interest is automatically 
limited by the extent to which its exercise prevents one from 
caring for those to whom one has an obligation.  As far as the 18th 
century concern with unintended consequences, Steuart’s maxim 
implies that while private vices can result in good, they cannot 
retroactively become virtuous if their motivation is bad.  Again, 
this principle is broad enough to allow for a nation’s particular 
religion, tradition, or spirit. 
Society is bonded by its shared traditions and history, which 
are necessarily different in all places.  Given this, the morality of 
any society is likewise found formed by history, and so the duties 
and obligations of one’s society guide one in the commercial 
realm.  Although self-interest is present, Steuart identifies 
dependence as “the only true bond of society” (207).  However, as 
shall be discussed in the section below on civic humanism, Steuart 
explores how the old social bonds have changed with the 
introduction of commerce, and posits an answer to the problem of 
the erosion of social obligation through political, rather than 
moral, virtue.   
Sympathy and Modern Morality 
Smith counters Steuart in finding a way that people in commercial 
society can be seen to be connected without recourse to conflict-
ridden histories and varying traditions.  In the WN, all men act out 
of self-interest, and such interest can be used to connect men 
together without traditional dependencies or a visible statesman 
through the division of labor, which renders men dependent on 
one another to supply their needs. However, in the TMS men can 
be moral, civil, and social without recourse to a culturally specific 
tradition of morality through the mechanism of sympathy.  
Published in 1759, the TMS counters the local, historically 
determined religious morality, which the Principles continues to 
assume in 1767, with an ahistorical rational morality.    
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In the formation of the theory, again Smith’s university 
connection has a definite influence.  In academia, there were many 
who were grappling with the new social and economic realities of 
the emergent market society and shifting political climate of the 
18th century.  From his famed professor Frances Hutcheson, 
Smith gained the key idea that just as there are natural laws 
governing the universe, so are there laws governing human 
nature.24  If such laws could be uncovered they could be used as a 
map for successful policy.25   
We agree with Winch (1992) that “the advancement of 
economics as a science” did not require “the separation of its 
subject matter from the extraneous considerations embodied in 
moral philosophy” (92).  There is a clear line of influence from the 
natural law moral philosophers to Adam Smith.  This has been 
explored in detail elsewhere (Hutchison 1988, 193-218; 
Teichgraber 1986; Young 1997, 112-117).  What we wish to explore 
here is how Smith’s thought, under the natural law influence, 
could be conceived as a universalist project on morality, and how 
this affected the eventual study of economics.   
In the TMS, Smith creates a system of morality consonant with 
the new market society.  Rather than trying to see how old bonds 
of social obligation can be maintained in the face of 
commercialism, Smith demonstrates that by eliminating these 
bonds, society will not only survive but prosper in their absence. 
Due to the decrease of social dependency, social obligations were 
replaced with commercial relations.  However, Smith is aware that 
this does not preclude people still being relatively dependent on 
each other due to invisible connections.  Smith’s great project in 
the TMS is to derive an ahistorical, areligious, atraditional concept 
of morality for modern commercial society.   
The TMS is based on Smith’s great innovation of the 
redefinition or refinement of the concept of sympathy.  Through 
the conscious use of rationality, sympathy can be created for any 
situation, becoming another invisible cord connecting every 
member of society.26   Sympathetic action then aids one in acting 
                                                        
24 Smith also inherited Hutcheson’s critique of Mandeville’s contention 
in the Fable of the Bees (1714) that no actions are altruistic and that 
public benefits occur only because other people’s vices require 
fulfillment.  Hutcheson developed a theory of benevolence, which 
allowed society to function in the absence of vice (Hutchison 1988).  
25 Hutcheson, who learned natural law theory under Gershom 
Carmichael, the first chair of moral philosophy at Glasgow, was also well-
versed in the writings of the Dutch Grotius and Pufendorf, who 
advocated a system of natural rights by which society should be 
understood and governed (Teichgraeber 1986, Young 1997 ).  
26 According to one of his students, Smith was aware that he was 
departing from how moral philosophy had previously been taught: “…he 
soon saw the necessity of departing widely from the plan that had been 
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with propriety.  One goal of the TMS is to properly instruct people 
in how to interact in a civil, interdependent, commercial society 
with propriety, which gives one the standards by which to judge 
whether one’s or another’s actions are good or bad.  Since, 
according to Smith, all actions are taken and judged according to 
how we think others see us, the goal of propriety is to win the 
approbation of others (Smith 1976, 9-19). 
However, propriety is not formed by history, but through an 
exercise of the imagination.  Through the use of an imagined 
impartial spectator, “the man within the breast,” one generates an 
ahistorical and areligious sympathy for others, which helps one to 
temper one’s emotions and to interact with others (82-85 and 128-
32).  Guided by the impartial spectator, sympathy is both the 
foundation of our judgments of the behavior of others, and also 
how we are able to engage in fellow-feeling with others.   
Creating fellow-feeling is necessary because we can feel for 
others only out of our own personal experience, by putting 
ourselves in another’s place: 
…our senses will never inform us of what he suffers.  They 
never did and never can, carry us beyond our own person, 
and it is by the imagination only that we can form any 
conception of what are his sensations (9). 
It is only after this act of the imagination has taken place that, “His 
agonies…when we have thus adopted them and made them our 
own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at 
the thought of what he feels” (9). 
However, such shuddering is not allowed to continue 
indefinitely.  Smith tells us that we control our emotions better in 
the presence of strangers than of friends, “for if we are at all 
masters of ourselves, the pretence of a mere acquaintance will 
really compose us still more than that of a friend; and that of an 
assembly of strangers still more than that of an acquaintance” 
(29).  Therefore we must introduce a stranger, the impartial 
spectator, to judge of our actions and the actions of others if we 
are to have true sympathy with others and to act with propriety in 
society.  Likewise, the object of sympathy is required to also lower 
the “pitch” of his emotions to an acceptable level and not display 
excessive grief or pain.  Only by such a lowering can he hope to 
gain sympathy, 
…he can only hope to obtain this by lowering his passion 
to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of going 
along with him.  He must flatten, if I may be allowed to 
say so, the sharpness of his natural tone, in order to 
                                                                                                                            
followed by his predecessors, and of directing the attention of his pupils 
to studies of a more interesting and useful nature than the logic and 
metaphysics of the schools” (Stewart, 11). 
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reduce it to harmony and concord with the emotions of 
those who are about him (22). 
In this awareness and deliberate containment of emotions, 
therefore, a connection is made which introduces uniformity and 
equilibrium analogous to the market process in the WN.  The 
exchange of sympathies is also mutually beneficial.  Even though 
we may originally engage in sympathy in order to gain sympathy 
from others, we also gain self-restraint, by expressing ourselves 
properly, and benevolence, by extending sympathy to others.  As 
in the market, the economy of the passions can be smoothly 
adjusted to produce order.  Thus, sympathy creates civility.  
Morality based on fellow-feeling generated by an impartial 
spectator in the mind is quite different from morality based upon 
historically determined religion or duty.  The effect of having a 
constructed morality based on a deliberate transformation of 
passion, or unschooled parochial loyalties, is that when one moves 
to the economic realm, the feudal, paternal obligation to care for 
one’s own or for the other also disappear.  Markets then can 
operate in the absence of a statesman’s visible hand of 
intervention. 
There is then continuity, rather than a polar opposition, 
between the morality of the TMS and the market of the WN.  The 
government does not have to oversee an economy that will 
eventually break down; it just has to provide the framework in 
which the economy is generally left to work itself out.  However, 
just as sympathy ties people together socially, the economy 
requires a bonding agent between people as well, which in the WN 
is to be found in the division of labour.  Again dealing with 
unobserved entities that can only be imagined, Smith’s invisible 
hand leads a society to increased production and capital 
accumulation, which garners approbation due to the increase of a 
nation’s wealth.   
Although the sources of sympathy extend back to Hutcheson, 
Hume and Kames and may have been influenced by Addison’s Mr 
Spectator as well as Calvinism, Smith’s application of these 
influences is broader in his vision for a transtemporal and 
transcultural morality.  The TMS offers the promise of attaining a 
measure of a civil understanding and interaction with others, 
regardless of who or where they are.  To enlightened Scotsmen 
seeking to integrate themselves into English society, Smith’s 
system is ideal.  As Gibbons (2003) observes, one of the 
achievements of the Scottish enlightenment is “to shift moral 
philosophy away from its grounding in inner experience towards 
social interaction” (93).  In this light, the TMS can be read as a 
“cultural manifesto” of integration of the Scots into polite English 
society (93).  In order to generalize this result beyond Scotland, 
Smith additionally shifts morality out of history and into the mind.   
In terms of social behavior in the marketplace, Smith makes a 
careful erasure where Steuart’s work is concerned.  Steuart 
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identifies the motivations for human action as self-interest, duty, 
and passion, whereas Smith’s emphasis in the WN is 
conspicuously only on the first.  While duty, passion, and 
obligation are going to be influenced by one’s history and culture, 
self-interest can be divorced from a particular cultural milieu.  
Steuart’s other categories lie outside of Smith’s consideration 
because they are all culturally and historically contingent and 
Smith seeks to transcend history. 
Civic Humanism and Natural Law  
As stated above, the Principles display Steuart’s attachment to 
traditional mores and morality, and an absence of a separate 
moral system analogous to the TMS.  However, Steuart is still 
confronted with the problem of the corruption of virtue in the new 
commercial society.  In order to maintain a country-specific 
outlook and yet deal with this new problem at the same time, 
Steuart focuses on political rather than moral virtue. This leads to 
another contestation between Smith and Steuart on the role of the 
virtuous state in the commercial age. 
In The Machiavellian Moment (1975) and Virtue, Commerce, 
and History (1985), Pocock presents two opposed schools of 
political thought.  One, the civic humanist, bears great 
resemblance to much of the thought of Steuart.  Although Smith 
also addresses civic humanist concerns, the opposing school of 
thought, natural law jurisprudence, bears more of a resemblance 
to Smith.   Civic humanism views people as naturally social, and 
thus political, beings.  Citizens are those who defend the country 
in the militia, and who own and properly cultivate their property, 
which confers both independence and leisure.  Acting for the 
public good is how citizens exercise their virtue, and it is this that 
displays their equality.  Leadership comes about by “the few” to 
whom “the many” naturally voluntarily defer. 
The civic humanist point of view was still very much a factor in 
18th century Scottish political and economic debate.  In the Union 
debates Andrew Fletcher repeatedly expressed that the Union 
would dissolve not only the Scottish state but also the Scottish 
citizens’ means of exercising virtue.  As a compromise, he called 
for the formation of a Scottish militia and a federal union, both of 
which would allow Scots to exercise their uniquely Scottish virtue.  
According to Phillipson (1983) and Robertson (1983), when 
Fletcher’s measures were rejected a new conception of virtue 
became necessary in order to reconcile commerce with liberty and 
virtue.   
Such a reconciliation was necessary because commerce was 
seen as a form of corruption.  From the early development of civic 
humanist thought in the Florentine republics to the writings of the 
17th century English political theorists, corruption was seen as the 
enemy of virtue.  In 18th century Britain, commerce, as conducted 
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under the Whig regime, becomes the corruptor of civic virtue.27  
Steuart’s conception of the virtuous statesman, which shall be 
discussed below, is one response to this conflict, while the 
preoccupation with civility and politeness that has been discussed 
throughout this essay is another. 
Juxtaposed to the civic humanist ideal is the civil 
jurisprudential tradition, which is based on a belief in unchanging 
human nature in the face of an ever-shifting history.  Whereas 
civic humanism is concerned with virtue, civil jurisprudence’s 
main concern is with rights and the distribution of goods.  
Property rights are seen as a natural development due to 
mankind’s originally having been granted ownership of the earth 
in common (Hont and Ignatieff, 43). Here, “the individual and his 
social and moral world are defined in terms of the property 
transactions in which he is engaged” (Pocock 1983, 249).  Instead 
of virtue the goal is justice in dispensing and dealing with rights.  
In this worldview liberty comes not from political participation, 
defense, and the care of the land, but from the pursuit of 
individual interests that do not infringe on other’s property and 
rights.  As Pocock says succinctly, “the polis is replaced by 
politeness and the oikos by economy.”  Therefore the citizen is one 
who respects others’ rights while increasing his own property and 
participating in the progress of society through an ever-increasing 
division of labour in the economy (242-243). 
Steuart’s Civic Humanist Government 
As has been acknowledged, but not fully explored, by Doujon 
(1994), Steuart employs civic humanist discourse in the Principles 
to reconcile modern commercial society with the need for virtue.  
Just as in the classical republican works of Machiavelli, 
Harrington, Fletcher, and Davenant, the persistent goals of 
Steuart’s economy are stability, balance, and the public good.  As 
has been shown above, Steuart’s experience and the facts of 
history led him to believe that the economy will neither naturally 
always attain balance nor the public good.  Such imbalance, 
combined with his political belief in the need for a local and 
interested ruler familiar with a people’s history, civic humanist 
theory partially explains the need for Steuart’s statesman to 
intervene in the economy. 
Steuart acknowledges that the republican form of government 
is the best because “…trade and industry have been found to 
                                                        
27 Besides instituting a system of public credit to finance the ongoing 
wars with France, the Whigs also began a system of political patronage 
and waived the feudal obligation of military service in exchange for 
payment.  Opponents of the Whig regime argued along civic humanist 
lines in their defense of the citizen as head of his household and master 
of his lands, which were to be used for agriculture, rather than 
manufactures, in order to cultivate his personal virtue (Pocock 1983, 
237). 
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flourish best under the republican form, and under those which 
have come the nearest to it,” due to the uniform application of the 
laws (211).  Such uniformity contributes to liberty, which is 
founded on freedom from arbitrary domination and uniform laws 
for the common good, not upon rights as in the juristic school:  
By a people’s being free, I understand no more than their 
being governed by general laws, well known, not 
depending upon the ambulatory will of any man, or any 
set of men, and established so as not to be changed, but in 
a regular and uniform way; for reasons which regard the 
body of the society, and not through favour or prejudice to 
particular persons, or particular classes (206). 
Therefore, one can enjoy liberty while under the authority of 
another, such as a sovereign, due to Steuart’s distinction between 
subordination and dependence.  Subordination occurs when there 
is “implied an authority which superiours have over inferiors,” and 
dependence when the inferiors gain “certain advantages” from 
their state of subordination (207).  For example, servants are both 
subordinate and dependent because they serve their masters and 
depend on them for subsistence.   
Dependence is always present and necessary because it “is the 
only bond of society” (207).  It is the degree of men’s dependence 
upon each other that has changed.  Property was the key to 
citizenship, and therefore, to freedom, prior to the introduction of 
the commercial system, or “trade and industry.”28  Modern 
industry allows liberty to be distributed among all classes of 
society, so that even those without land can be independent, while 
it also creates a new commercial dependence between the workers 
and the rich.  In the general introduction to Book I, the change in 
relationship between the governing and the governed is attributed 
to: 
…the discovery of America and the Indies, the springing 
up of industry and learning, the introduction of trade and 
the luxurious arts, the establishment of public credit, and 
a general system of taxation, [which] have entirely altered 
the plan of government every where (23).29 
These changes have brought formerly well-understood societal 
roles into question.  In keeping with the civic humanist tradition, 
                                                        
28 Steuart defines “industry” as the trading of one’s goods or labour time 
in exchange for wages or a circulating equivalent that can be used to 
exchange for other commodities or wants (146).   
29 Steuart’s discussion and wording are extremely similar to that of 
Andrew Fletcher (1997) on the same topic (2-4).   
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Steuart upholds the noble claim to martial virtue and opposes 
replacing the militia with a standing army (71).30  
It is now impossible for all independent citizens, those holding 
both physical and phantom property in the forms, respectively, of 
land and credit, to act for the public good. The nobility are not 
immune to the corruption engendered in their pursuit of modern 
luxury goods. Likewise, the newly independent have not been 
raised since birth, like the nobility, to sacrifice for the public good 
and are likely to look to their own interests only.  Yet such self-
interest is necessary for economic growth, and only time and 
education will instill in a commercial society an other-
interestedness.   
Therefore, in the short run, maintenance of the public good 
falls to the statesman, whose interest is not for himself but for the 
public: “Self-interest, when considered with regard to him, is 
public spirit; and it can only be called self-interest, when it is 
applied to those who are governed by it” (142).  By exercising his 
nation-interested “self-interest,” it is the statesman who exercises 
virtue in society, on behalf of all society for the common good. 
The statesman must always act with both virtue and justice: 
Constant and uninterrupted experience has proved to 
man, that virtue and justice, in those who govern, are 
sufficient to render the society happy…Virtue and justice, 
when applied to government, mean no more than a tender 
affection for the whole society, and an exact and impartial 
regard for the interest of every class (20). 
Such intervention as Steuart promotes is clearly an engagement 
with Machiavelli’s fortuna, or, in 17th century civic humanist 
discourse, instability.  While the Machiavellian moment of 
confronting fortuna occurs in the political arena, Steuart also sees 
this great instability in the economy, in the form of unemployment 
and other harmful disequilibria, such as surpluses and shortages.   
Thus Steuart imbues the statesman with Machiavelli’s almost 
inhuman virtu to confront the corruption both in the economy 
and the state. Although citizens can still practice virtue in this new 
non-state arena by participating in commerce, which strengthens 
the state, and thus increases the public good, they cannot do so at 
all times.  The statesman exercises virtue in a way not available to 
regular citizens.  In a commercial society where old social bonds 
have been eroded, no one but the statesman has the proper 
                                                        
30 His language strongly defends the bravery of the nobles against the 
self-interest of the moneyed class conception of civic virtue stems from 
his own definition of virtue as well as:  
…compare the behaviour of those conducted by a warlike nobility, with 
those conducted by the sons of labour and industry; those who have 
glory, with those who have gain for their point of view (71).  
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prudence, foresight, or accumulated knowledge to either correct or 
prevent imbalances.31     
As Hont (1983) notes, Steuart is more concerned with “the 
stability of commerce than that of manners”(296). The distant 
legislation of London and the recent history of Scotland, and 
indeed history in general shows Steuart that economic stability 
cannot be left to the individuals in a commercial state because 
they no longer occupy the same social roles, have not all been 
schooled in the public good, and now face a non-military form of 
corruption.  The presence and action of the statesman, however, 
will ensure both the political virtue of the state in the increase of 
the public good and the economic virtue of the state in stability.  A 
local and involved statesman also ensures the attention to 
circumstance that Steuart stresses throughout the Principles.  
However, such sentiments would be seen as anachronistic to 
Steuart’s enlightenment contemporaries, to whom “’ancient virtue’ 
now no longer entailed Scottish nationalism” (Pittock 2001, 75). 
Property, Propriety, and the Natural Law 
According to Phillipson (1993), Hume continues the work of 
Defoe, Steele, and Addison in trying to create a new language of 
manners, which, over time, would become common sense and so 
reform behavior.  Manners are thus to be the new conduit of 
virtue, as they encourage moderation, which benefits the public 
good (308-310).  Smith continues the work of Hume and the 
others, and thereby does the opposite of Steuart, by placing virtue 
in the social rather than the political realm, in the exercise of 
propriety rather than through the defense of property.  As much 
more has been written on Smith, most notably in Hont and 
Ignatieff (1983) regarding his theories on commerce and virtue, 
we shall not treat this material as extensively as the lesser-known 
Steuart.  However, some explanation is required to show how 
Smith’s project of universalism and view of economic progress 
produce yet another version of virtue. 
Smith rejects many aspects of the civic humanist conception of 
virtue.  Generally, his work presents an opposition between 
traditional clan or family-based society, which he conflates with 
“ideas of patriarchal authority and ‘dependence’ and with the 
servile values of feudal civilization…,”and modern civilized society 
based on sympathy between strangers (Phillipson 1983, 188).  
Book V of the WN shows that the growth of commerce, private 
property, and progress causes the division of labor, and therefore 
both a delegation of martial and political duties of citizens to 
others, and therefore a lessening of dependence of individuals 
upon masters.  Only backward and “barbarous” societies do not 
                                                        
31 The statesman is however to attempt to instill the virtues of prudence, 
justice, wisdom, foresight, and frugality into his people by himself acting 
with these virtues and thereby direct private interests to the public good 
(231-232). 
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specialize and are wholly self-sufficient.32   “Commerce,” Smith 
tells us in the Lectures on Jurisprudence, “is the great 
preventative of this custom” (6-7).  For Smith, the corruption of 
virtue occurs not in commerce, but when there are both a general 
dependence of one upon another and a lack of property, both of 
which imply a lack of progress.  Civic humanism then is both 
unjust, due to the presence of slavery and communal property, 
and unproductive, due to the absence of the division of labor and 
property rights.  For Smith modern virtue does not consist in 
political action, but in sympathetic social relations and 
interdependent, yet individual, commercial relations, which will, 
respectively, provide benevolence and the satisfaction of the needs 
of society.   
With this new conception of virtue, Smith neatly eliminates 
the need for a statesman such as Steuart’s, and therefore the need 
for a local and culturally aware ruler.  In establishing 
independence and the division of labor as key factors in his 
successful economy, Smith refutes Steuart’s claim of dependence 
being the only bond of society.  He also dismisses the possibility of 
self-sufficient subcultures, such as those in the Scottish 
Highlands, being part of progressive and proper modern 
commercial society by relegating them to “barbarousness.”  Again 
Smith dissolves historical ties and the particularities of location, 
as propriety and the division of labour can, in theory, arise 
anywhere. 
However, Smith also engages in the natural law jurisprudence 
tradition that Pocock identifies as being opposed to civic 
humanism.  As in the jurisprudence tradition, Smith presents 
property as a natural development from the initial grand of the 
earth to mankind, which was then divided due to the division of 
labour, and the emergence of government as a means to protect it.  
Liberty is not active as in civic humanism, but refers mainly to the 
right to use one’s property as one wishes without harming others 
and without the fear of that right being violated.  Individual 
property-owners can be virtuous, because the development of 
their property has the unintended consequence of supplying 
others’ needs, but society as a whole cannot, as it is made of self-
serving individuals (Hont and Ignatieff 43-44).  In stressing 
property and propriety’s vital, natural role in individual liberty 
and virtue, Smith overrides the importance Steuart places on older 
forms of social organization and dependence.  Whether answering 
Steuart from within the civic humanist or civil jurisprudence 
frameworks, Smith establishes a universal means for a modern 
commercial society to continue to progress regardless of past 
history or social obligation.  
                                                        
32 A similar sentiment is also expressed in Bk I, chapter III where 
Highland production is shown to be inefficient due to the small size of 
the market as well as an absence of the division of labor (WN, 19). 
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Reception and Rejection: The Principles and the WN in the 18th 
and 19 Centuries 
As has already been noted above and has been seen in the history 
of economic thought, Steuart’s work is upsetting to his English 
critics and largely ignored by the mid-19th century.  Concerned 
with smaller nations such as Scotland, Steuart creates a vision of 
an economy that is largely self-sufficient and can build itself from 
simple origins.  Steuart generalizes the situation of Scotland, 
making his work applicable to smaller nations building economies 
from basic foundations.  Partially, this explains his strong 
reception in Germany where Steuart is still seen as an authority by 
the German Historical School well into the 19th century.33  
Germany in the 18th century was still made of smaller kingdoms 
and in the 19th century sought unification as a nation.  In the 
process the Germans found themselves confronting the same 
problem as the Scots had in1707: the political and economic 
consequences of English commercial power:   
[due to its free trade policies] Britain’s overwhelming 
productivity discouraged the growth of industrial capital 
in less developed countries, i.e. everywhere but in Britain.  
And the introduction of free trade amounted to excessive 
competition that led to the fall of traditional craftsmen 
and worsening social problems (Kobayashi 2001, 64-65). 
Therefore, the German economists needed a theory that 
acknowledged the link between the economy and the nation, and 
between economics and politics, such that “development appeared 
as the development of a nation and of a national economy” 
(Kobayashi 2001, 62).  Smith’s theories are not sufficient for this 
task, as they assume an already-advanced economy, which was not 
yet present in all of Germany, in addition to a lessening of the role 
of politics.34  Steuart’s work, however, with the culturally and 
historically knowledgeable statesman guiding the ship of the 
economy provides a suitable guidebook. 
Empire and Economy: Unintended Consequences? 
Unlike Steuart, Smith does not generalize the Scottish situation, 
but rather the mindset of the civilized North Briton.  The man of 
reason, of sympathy, with polished dialect and manners is the 
universal man, and so the solutions found in the system of natural 
liberty can be extended to any situation and indeed any location.  
                                                        
33 The rest is explained by Steuart’s common cameralist foundations and 
attention to history.  Herrenschwand, Hufeland, Rehberg, Roscher, and 
Schmid are some of the German Historical School economists who 
reference Steuart over Smith in their textbooks (Sen 1957 and Tribe 
1988, 136). 
34 This explains the weak reception of the WN in Germany, where it took 
even longer to find an audience than it had at home (Tribe 1988, 133-
148). 
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As argued above, Smith’s use of the conjectural method allows for 
the local to become unimportant and the distant imaginable, 
connecting the seemingly unconnected.  Through the disregard of 
history and location, Scotland’s historical differences are 
consigned to the primitive past and not to the progressive 
universalist future.  By thus relegating Scottish difference to the 
past and the Scotsman as all men, Smith achieves socially what the 
Union sought politically, and, therefore, as Gibbons notes, “the 
‘impartial’ shades imperceptibly into the ‘imperial’ spectator” 
(1996, 288-289).   
In this there is another explanation for the gradual ascendancy 
of Smith’s version of political economy over Steuart’s in the early 
19th century.  By this time Britain had become a formidable 
imperial power, and part of its colonizing ethos was to civilize its 
conquered peoples through the benevolence and order of English 
rule and markets.  Smith’s work is compatible with an imperialist 
mindset precisely because of its modern, ahistorical nature that 
views progress as any movement away from a traditional self-
sufficient economy or from tradition itself.  However, such a 
system is not content to halt at achieving its own progress.  As 
Deane (1994) observes, such a system built on abstraction, results 
in a political and moral philosophy that, 
…has only one mode of existence for its survival.  It 
travels.  It cannot linger in the actual.  It cannot stay at 
home.  Its home is always abroad in the world of desire 
and abstraction...it is, at base a reconstruction of the 
modes of social relationship that constitute society (15).  
A successful empire requires just such a social reconstruction.  
Smith’s abstract and conjectural theories of sentiment, 
government, language, and markets provide such a reformulation. 
Not bound to any one culture or location, Smith’s theories are 
adaptable and exportable to all “uncivilized,” disorderly cultures.  
If all men are theorized to be alike, then the policies of England can 
be assumed to be equally applicable and fortuitous for the people of 
Ireland, India, Africa, or Asia.  It need not matter that an English 
governor, viceroy, or prime minister does not have the proper 
knowledge of a colony's history, or people, if all people are alike, and 
if he can create sympathy to act in their interest.  As for economics, if 
one theorizes abstract economies without regard to time or place, 
then a centralized government can hand down economic policy just 
as successfully as Steuart assumes the local statesman can.  
The work of Steuart, on the other hand, does not just imply 
that men are not alike, but baldly states it.  His repeated 
references to the differences of peoples and the importance of a 
local and involved ruler are counter to the basic assumption of the 
universalized human and therefore centralized policy.  In the late 
18th century when Scottish separatist tendencies were still 
prevalent and the English government was also trying to subdue 
the Irish and Americans, Steuart's political economy would seem 
Ramos and Mirowski 33 Poroi, 7,1 (January 2011) 
absurdly antithetical to the imperialist project.  Thus it is little 
surprise that he should fall out of favor the farther one moves into 
the 19th century. 
Smith envisages the system of natural liberty freeing people 
from the strictures of the ancien regime traditions of dependency 
and favoritism.  However, in the hands of the promoters and 
politicians of 19th century British imperial expansion, his writings 
are used rather differently.    Prime Minister William Pitt writes in 
a 1792 speech that there are no limits to the civilizing effects of 
capital and commerce,  
…while there exists at home any one object of skill or 
industry short of its utmost possible perfection; one spot 
of ground in the country capable of higher cultivation and 
improvement; or while there remains any existing market 
that can be extended…The rude wants of countries 
emerging from barbarism, and the artificial and increasing 
demands of luxury and refinement, will equally open new 
sources of treasure, and new fields of exertion, in every 
state of society, and in the remotest quarters of the globe.  
It is this principle, which, I believe, according to the 
uniform result of history and experience, maintains…a 
continued course of successive improvement in the 
general order of the world (1998, 160). 
In the political guise of improvement, Smith’s theory of the 
civilizing power of commerce is used to justify further dependency.  
As Deane predicts though, politically and morally, this means that 
the theory must travel beyond the borders of Scotland and even 
Britain to, in Pitt’s words, “countries emerging from barbarism” 
and those “in the remotest quarters of the globe.”35   
Conclusion 
David Hume once wrote, 
Really it is admirable how many Men of Genius this 
Country produces at present.  Is it not strange that, at a 
time when we have lost our Princes, our Parliaments, our 
independent Government, even the Presence of our chief 
Nobility, are unhappy in our Accent & Pronunciation…is it 
not strange, I say, that in these Circumstances we shou’d 
really be the People now disitnguish’d for Literature in 
Europe? (cited in Allan 2002). 
As we have argued, the explosion of this “hotbed of genius,” as 
expatriate Scot Tobias Smollett once called the Scottish 
Enlightenment, occurred in part due to the very losses identified 
by Hume.  The movement to alter Scottish sensibilities and 
cultures mirrored the merging of parliaments and economies. 
                                                        
35 Various other British politicians made use of Smith’s theories at this 
time, including Lords Shelbourne, North, and Grenville (see Ross 1998). 
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Encouraged by the political leanings of the Scottish university 
professors in the early 18th century, the trend of equating 
modernity and civility with uniformity and universalism was 
nurtured throughout the 18th century, and became the intellectual 
foundation for Smith’s philosophy.  Political economy itself 
emerges as an attempt to answer the various questions of how best 
to govern the commercial system and how individuals in such a 
society should act in order to bring about progress in society. 
The University and the Universal Mind   
Although the Scottish Enlightenment began to fade by 1800, 
Smith’s theories and those of the rest of the Scottish enlighteners 
did not.  As we know, their concerns became the foundation for 
the modern social sciences.  Just as political economy has more 
than one cause for its emergence in the 18th century, likewise, the 
dissemination of ideas about political economy, and Smith’s 
political economy in particular, do not have a single source. 
Throughout the 18th century, there had always been a sideways 
dissemination of ideas from the Scottish literati to the general 
public through the facilities available to them at home: the coffee 
houses of the major cities, the literary and political clubs and 
societies such as the Political Economy Society in Glasgow and the 
Poker Club of Edinburgh, of which both Steuart and Smith were 
members, where politics, economics, law and literature were all 
discussed in order to spread both politeness and mutual 
understanding, as well as the journals and newspapers of the day 
(Allan 130; Wood 1994).     
To further explain how the ideas of the Scottish political 
economists became universal, again we return to Smith’s implicit 
and explicit erasure of Steuart.  Not only did Smith purposely 
neglect to mention Steuart, he also purposely altered the grounds 
on which political economy was based.  Using a conjectural rather 
than empirical method, Smith was able to erase not only Steuart 
but also obviates the need for the past and difference.  Where 
Steuart uses the real world as the object of his analysis, relying on 
induction, and the analysis of measurable variables, such as 
population, the number of people unemployed, and so on, Smith 
shifts the terrain of economic analysis to abstract ground.  
Whereas Steuart began the Principles with an analysis of the 
importance of the ratio of the population to the agricultural 
surplus, Smith begins the WN with the importance of the division 
of labour and mankind’s tendency to truck, barter, and trade from 
which it arises.  Discussion of the invisible hand and markets are 
more examples, as has been shown by Poovey (1998, 214-263).  
Using abstraction, Smith changes the field of economic analysis 
from the world of the real, where people are influenced by history, 
to the world of the mind where all properly civilized people can 
sympathize and theorize in harmony with each other.  Analysis of 
the invisible also allows for invisible and “natural” solutions rather 
than the visible hand of government intervention to solve 
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economic imbalances.  Loosed not only from a specific location, 
but from all location itself, Smith’s explanation of the economy 
and the market system could be used outside of Scotland, and 
indeed could be applied everywhere.   
In the late 18th century, as John Dwyer notes, “The erstwhile 
champions of forbearance and humanity could be extremely 
intolerant of anything, including their own heritage, that stood in 
the way of the concept of a polite British community” (cited in 
Gibbons 1996, 283).  A former Jacobite concerned with history 
and locality, who attempts to generalize the Scottish economic and 
developmental situation, Steuart was one casualty of such an 
approach.   
In the early 19th century, once the ideas of both men filtered 
back into and through the universities, political economy was to 
undergo another erasure.  The more radical aspects of Smith’s 
teachings, such as his secular morality, bid for uniform language, 
and conjectural method, were obscured by a view of Smith as a 
promoter of free trade.  Much of the credit such a veiling and the 
spread of Smithian universalism can be attributed to his pupil 
Dugald Stewart who, according to Brown (2000) and Wood 
(2000), created a canon of the Scottish Enlightenment that 
portrayed modernity as “commercial, bureaucratic, and morally 
capable” (150).36 
Stewart, therefore, set out to create a canon of a specific kind 
of Scottish thought.  He characterizes Scotland’s history before 
1745 as marked by “intolerance, bigotry, and barbarism” (cited in 
Wood 2000, 4). As Stewart rejects “the study of local laws and 
forms of government for an analysis of the underlying principles 
upon which progress occurred” and “The thrust of Stewart’s moral 
philosophy was, therefore, anti-traditional,” he would not have 
included Sir James Steuart among his canon of enlighteners 
(Brown 138-139).37   
In order to make his and Smith’s teachings on freedom from 
tradition and authority more acceptable to a society still 
threatened by the events in post-Revolutionary France, Stewart 
had to further separate politics from political economy. Thus he 
stresses both the anti-interventionism, commercial rationality, 
and moderation of the WN rather than the more radical aspects of 
Smith’s system of natural liberty.  Smith is presented as a political 
                                                        
36 This occurred in Stewart’s presentation of the biographies of Smith, 
Reid, and William Robertson to the Royal Society in Edinburgh.  Brown 
contends that Stewart undertook the biographies largely to justify his 
teaching of political and moral philosophy to the political interests who 
were members of the Royal Society as a progression of modernity (2000, 
145). 
37 Stewart (1966) does mention the Principles in a positive light in his 
lecture notes.  He praises the work for its wealth of factual knowledge but 
refers students to it only as a secondary source to the WN (458). 
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moderate, as opposed to what he appeared in his own time, a 
semi-radical French philosophe, as has been explored most 
recently in Rothschild (2002).  To accomplish this alteration, 
however, Stewart uses Smith’s tool of placing his argument firmly 
in the mind.  For example, he identifies “the provision made by 
nature in the principles of the human mind, and in the 
circumstances of man’s external situation, for a gradual and 
progressive augmentation in the means of national wealth” as 
being Smith’s goal in the WN (149).  Increased rationality and 
political moderation were of course very much in vogue to the 
English-speaking British audience of Stewart’s teachings in the 
wake of the French Revolution.  From Stewart’s classroom 
audience, his interpretation and further refinement of the 
universal Scotland of the mind spread was spread by his students, 
who included, among others, several editors of the influential 
Edinburgh Review and James Mill.38 
As Stewart separated his political economy lectures from the 
moral philosophy course in 1802, the first chair in political 
economy was thus also created, and political economy was seen to 
emerge from the university.  But it was a particular kind of 
political economy that was promoted: a conjectural study of 
abstract unverifiable entities that could conjure policies that were 
universally applicable.  True to his word to Pulteney, Smith, while 
never mentioning him, completely countered Steuart’s 
assumptions and obscured his contribution to political economy.  
Thus, in Dugald Stewart, what we have is an even more distilled 
version of Sir James Steuart’s original project of the science of 
political economy.  Rather than adding to his “canvas,” both Smith 
and Stewart continue to remove figures from it: namely the 
importance of history, location, culture, religion, and government 
guidance of the economy and economic policy.   
Rather than emerging full grown from the head of Smith from 
his analysis of the natural laws governing human nature, political 
economy can be seen to have emerged from a variety of 
contestations in the 18th century: between fact and the abstract, 
history and conjecture, intervention and free trade, commerce and 
tradition, sovereignty and subordination.  It also grew as a 
reaction to the dissolution of the Scottish government, and the 
subsequent movement to similarly dissolve traditional 
communities and economies in favor of the Union government 
and modern commerce.  In a sense, political economy is also a 
solution to the Scottish inferiority complex resulting from the 
Union.  As a would-be politician and anti-Unionist operative, 
Steuart’s Principles implicitly display a patriotic reaction of how a 
smaller nation can rise from economic obscurity to prominence 
through careful and knowledgeable governance and leadership.  
Smith, as a university professor and well-regarded philosopher, 
                                                        
38 Among Stewart’s pupils were: Francis Jeffrey, Henry Reeve, Macvey 
Napier, and Henry Brougham (Brown 137, Hont 1983, 315). 
Ramos and Mirowski 37 Poroi, 7,1 (January 2011) 
intellectualizes the subject of political economy by moving the 
object of analysis to the mind.  He of course also stresses 
uniformity and English civility as has been pointed to above.  In 
Dugald Stewart’s triumphal version of political economy, the 
moderating and rational aspects of Smith’s conjectural system are 
emphasized, and he continues to place the field of analysis firmly 
in the mind.  By placing the field of discourse in the abstract, in 
the realm of the mind, Smith and his cohorts demonstrate to the 
larger world that they have attained an intellectual sophistication 
belying their status as citizens of a backwater nation.  Although 
the same could be said of Steuart’s patriotic version of political 
economy, that generalizes the Scottish situation, Smith and 
Stewart hope to achieve something more than the solution of 
economic problems.  In Smith and Dugald Stewart’s triumphant 
universal version, that generalizes the rational Scotsman, these 
authors wish to signal something greatly significant to themselves 
and to the world of ideas, concerning Scotsmen.  In the Scottish 
creation and proliferation of a universalist, abstract, modern form 
of political economy, the Smith and Stewart show that the Scots 
are civilized citizens.  Rather than ignoble, they are now 
enlighteners. 
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